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Abstract: 
Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on how to solve the public-good dilemma. 
In a 'first generation' of experiments, this was done by presenting subjects with a pre-specified game 
out of a huge variety of rules. A 'second generation' of experiments introduced subjects to two 
different environments and had subjects choose between those. The present study is part of a 'third 
generation', asking subjects not only to choose between two environments but to design their own 
rule sets for the public-good problem. Whereas preceding 'third-generation' experiments had 
subjects design and improve their strategies for a specified game, this study is the first to make an 
attempt at answering the question of how people would shape their environment to solve the public-
good dilemma were they given full discretion over the rules of the game. We explore this question 
of endogenous institution design in an iterated design-and-play procedure. We observe a strong 
usage of punishment and redistribution components, which diminishes over time. Instead, subjects 
successfully contextualize the situation. Interestingly, feedback on fellow-players’ individual 
behavior tends to be rendered opaque. On average, rules do improve with respect to the welfare they 
elicit, albeit only to a limited degree. 
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Policies based on the assumptions that individuals can learn how to devise well-tailored 
rules and cooperate conditionally when they participate in the design of institutions 
affecting them are more successful in the field. (Ostrom, 1998, p.3) 
 
I.  Introduction 
Despite an impressive body of work on the issue, the high degree of cooperation amongst unrelated 
humans still remains a puzzle for those concerned with the study of human interactions (cf. e.g., 
Ledyard, 1995, Fehr and Gächter, 2000a, 2000b, or Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
 1 Why would an 
agent spend resources on promoting a public good in a one-shot situation without signaling 
opportunities when she can do better by free-riding on others' cooperative efforts? On the other 
hand, while substantial cooperation is going on amongst mankind, there are many instances in 
which one would hope for more, the efforts on the preservation of our very planet being an eminent 
example. Therefore the study of institutional settings that overcome the dilemma is advanced in 
various disciplines and with high intensity.
  
In much of this research, public-good games have been used as an experimental paradigm to study 
cooperation in a specific type of social-dilemma situation: subjects may either contribute (parts of) 
their resources to a common project that benefits society as a whole or they may keep them for 
private consumption. While it is socially beneficial to contribute fully, it is in the material interest of 
each subject to keep everything for private consumption. In the laboratory, it is commonly observed 
that contributions start off far below the socially optimal level and approach individually 'optimal' 
free-riding with increasing subject experience.
2  
In  order  to  overcome  socially  disadvantageous  free-riding,  experimental  subjects  have  been 
presented with a huge variety of institutional regulations. Among the most prominent rule features 
examined are punishment opportunities,
3 communication,
4 leadership,
5 reputation opportunities,
6 
and ostracism.
7 In this “first generation” of experiments, subjects were exogenously exposed to the 
experimenter-determined  institutional  rules.  This  provides  us  with  valuable  information  on  the 
performance of these rules. However, these settings cannot answer the question whether subjects 
                                                 
1  For an overview of the theoretical approaches concerned with explaining cooperation, cf. e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 
(2002). 
2  Cf. Ledyard (1995) or Ostrom (2000). 
3  E.g. Yamagishi (1986), Fehr and Gächter (2000a), Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003), Nikiforakis 
(2008), Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), or Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2005).  
4  E.g. Isaac and Walker (1988), Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), Cason and Khan (1999), Brosig, Weimann and 
Ockenfels (2003), or Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2006). 
5  E.g. Vesterlund (2003), Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2005), Arbak and Villeval (2007), or Güth, et al. (2007).  
6  E.g. Milinski, et al. (2006), or Sommerfeld, et al. (2007). 
7  E.g. Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2005), Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson and Staffiero (2005), or Güth, et al. 
(2007).   3 
would actually develop or choose a specific rule. Consequently, subsequent studies have addressed 
the question of collective rule choices, both by ballot voting and by 'voting-with-one's-feet'.
8 These 
studies provide the important insight that the initial acceptance of punishment mechanisms is quite 
low  but  grows  over  time  up  to  the  extent  that  the  mechanism  may  ultimately  be  accepted 
completely.  The  limitation  of  these  “second-generation”  studies  is  that  they  shed  light  on  the 
acceptance of experimenter-given mechanisms, but cannot answer the question which mechanisms 
would actually be developed.  
 
A "third generation" experiment 
In  this  paper,  we  proceed  by  introducing  an  experiment  of  a  “third  generation”  in  which  we 
endogenize the design of the institutional regulations. This approach bears a close resemblance to 
the studies of Axelrod (1984), Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997), Keser and Gardner (1999), 
and Keser (2000). While Axelrod asked scholars of game theory to specify complete strategies for a 
prisoners’ dilemma, which could be refined in a second round, Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich had 
student subjects do the same for an asymmetric Cournot duopoly over several rounds. Keser and 
Gardner (1999) and Keser (2000) applied the method to a common-pool resource and a public-good 
problem,  respectively.  While,  in  the  studies  mentioned,  subjects  were  completely  free  in  their 
design of a strategy for a given situation, to the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first 
tackling the question of institution design for social-dilemma situations in this way. In other words, 
in our experiment, subjects are not only free to choose and adapt their behavior, but they actually 
act as lawmakers empowered to shape the institutional environment of the game. 
At the same time as providing us with valuable insights about real-world institution formation, the 
chosen approach comes with a high level of complexity, which renders the gathering of a number of 
observations sufficient for sensible statistical analysis virtually impossible. For this reason, we do 
not intend to single out statistically significant effects of subtle changes in the environment but see 
our  contribution  as  an  explorative  advance  into  the  white-waters  of  how  experimental  subjects 
approach the problem of designing adequate institutional frameworks for social-dilemma situations 
-- and how well they do in this task. 
The experiment was conducted over 3 months in the framework of two student seminars in which 
                                                 
8  For studies building on ballot votes, cf. e.g. Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2005), Sutter, Haigner and Kocher 
(2005), or Guillen, Schwieren and Staffiero (2007), 'voting-with-one's-feet' was used by Gürerk, Irlenbusch and 
Rockenbach (2006) or Rockenbach and Milinski (2006). Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl (forthc.) also use a 'voting-with-
one's-feet' mechanism, but in contrast to Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach, subjects choose to form and become 
subject to a sanctioning institution, rather than choosing between two separate worlds.   4 
the participants' task was to design institutional regulations to overcome a social dilemma. Before 
designing the institutional regulations subjects gathered experience in playing the basic public-good 
game in an anonymous laboratory setting. Following that, they were given a week to develop a set 
of rules of play for this game. There was no predefined set of rules so that subjects could freely 
choose whatever rules they wanted to implement, as long as the incentive structure still exhibited 
the social-dilemma characteristics. To achieve a certain degree of external validity we attached a 
certain cost to each of the proposed rules according to the true (relative) costs such an institution 
would give rise to in common real-world settings. After this first design phase, a different set of 
subjects played the public-good game under these rules and the designers were rewarded according 
to the efficiency, i.e. sum of players’ profits minus rule costs, the players achieved under their rule. 
The design-and-play process was repeated three times. This quite elaborate design (described in 
detail in section 2) enables us to study the development process of the institutional mechanism in an 
iterated-improvement procedure.  
Research questions 
Even though by taking a step further than most studies we forfeit the advantage of examining the 
effect  of  changing  a  single  treatment  variable  holding  all  other  things  constant,  the  research 
questions that inspired our design remain firmly grounded in the existing literature: 
1. Will subjects make use of the solutions researched in the literature, or are they going to attempt at 
finding their own ways out of the dilemma? Will their rule sets contain elements of a) punishment, 
b) communication, c) leadership opportunities and d) reputational mechanisms, and e) ostracism? 
2. Are rule sets going to be based on a single rule characteristic or are they going to be intricate 
combinations of several such characteristics? 
3. Will rule sets "converge" to a single, possibly successful set that is the same across all groups, 
and possibly across seminars? 
What we find is (1) that they make extensive but decreasing use of punishment, they hardly provide 
opportunities to communicate, and no opportunities to increase contributions by assigning leaders 
or ostracizing others. Also reputation-building elements are present only in one third of all rule sets. 
Instead, they often make use of framing and moral appeals, and they try to create positive incentives 
by redistribution. (2) For the most part, subjects try to combine two or even more rule components 
instead  of  relying  on  a  single-component  rule  set.  Finally,  (3)  there  is  no  clear  "winner"  rule 
component or combination, and thus,  rule sets retain and even increase the diversity  of  earlier 
tournaments also in the final tournament instead of "converging" to a single combination of rule 
components.   5 
The paper is organized  into six parts.  In section  II  of the paper,  we present the design of our 
experiment in due detail, as well as specifying the game-theoretic model of the underlying basic 
public-good game. In section III, we analyze the observed rule sets, classifying them along four 
basic  component  categories.  We  evaluate  rule  performance  and  the  rule-adaptation  process  in 
section IV and perform a typicity analysis to determine what may have been 'typical mistakes' and 
'typical improvements' in section V. Also in this section, we explore the relationship between rule-
component typicity and rule-set performance, finally arriving at a tentative 'rule of choice'. Finally, 
in section VI, we discuss our findings and derive some possible implications for real-life situations. 
 
II.  Model and experimental design 
In order to find out what kinds of rules people would give themselves were they free to do so, we 
recruited 24 students of economics at the University of Erfurt for two separate seminar-type courses 
(12 in each seminar). The seminars ran over 70 days from April to July 2007. Upon arrival, students 
were allocated to rule-development groups of 4 who stayed together for the entire seminar. We 
asked the participants of both seminars not to interact with the participants of the other seminar, 
however, we could not control that this was actually complied with. The course of each seminar is 
summarized in Table 1.  
During  a  preliminary  meeting,  potential  seminar  participants  were  introduced  to  the  schedule. 
However, they were not informed on what game they would be going to face during the seminar.
9 
The seminar was not accompanied by any lectures on theoretic or experimental investigations into 
social dilemmas, neither in this term nor in previous terms. On the first day of the seminar (Day 1 in 
Table 1), the participants experienced the basic game by playing it in a laboratory setting over 25 
rounds in a partner design. The basic game was a standard public-good game with four players. 
Each player i would make a contribution of xi from an endowment of 20 tokens to a common 
project and keep the remainder. The total contributions were multiplied by 1.6 and divided evenly 
amongst the players, so that the public good exhibited a constant marginal per-capita return of 0.4. 
The resulting payoff function of subject i is therefore:  
Πi = 20 - xi + 0.4 Σxj. 
Subjects were informed only about the sum of contributions, not about individual contributions and 
there was neither punishment nor any other additional non-standard rule feature.  
                                                 
9   See Appendix A for the information passed to those present at the preliminary meeting, as well as to the instructions 
for the basic game.   6 
Time  Playing stages  Rule development 
  Preliminary meeting 
Day 1:  play of the basic public-good game  development groups formed 
Days 2-6:    development of 1
st set of rules 
Day 7:    handing-in of rules 
Days 8-13:  software implementation (experimenter)   
Day 14:  1
st rule tournament   
Days 15-20:    development of 2
nd set of rules 
Day 21:    handing-in of rules 
Day 22-27:  software implementation (experimenter)   
Day 28:  2
nd rule tournament   
Days 29-34:    development of 3
rd set of rules 
Day 35:    handing-in of rules 
Days 36-41  software implementation (experimenter)   
Day 42:  3
rd rule tournament (double weighting)   
Days 43-48:    4
th set of rules 
Day 49:    handing-in of rules 
Days 50-55:  software implementation (experimenter)   
Day 56:  4
th rule tournament (triple weighting)   
Day 70:  Final meeting; discussion 
 
Table 1: Schedule of the seminars 
 
Rule design 
At  the  end  of  the  first  meeting  participants  were  randomly  allocated  to  design  groups  of  four 
students each who stayed together until the end of the seminar. The participants had one week to 
develop their own set of rules for the public-good game within these design groups. There was no 
pre-defined “menu” of rules and the subjects were free to develop whatever rules they wanted (in 
the boundaries of standard rules of ethics). Each rule (component) is potentially attached to costs. 
The costs were meant to reflect the expenditures such a regulation would imply in a real-world 
setting. Thus, we tried to approximate the rules' costs by estimating what the implementation of 
such a rule would entail in real-life situations. For some rule sets, costs were split into a fixed and a 
variable part: e.g. to set up the infrastructure to make public announcements as a fixed cost and the 
variable costs of actually making announcements. The most severe and therefore most expensive 
interventions are restrictions of the players’ action space, e.g. to exclude complete free-riding or to 
even enforce full contribution. These kinds of coercion would not only require a lot of enforcement   7 
power,  but  severely  change  the  nature  of  the  game  and  therefore,  the  cost  of  full-contribution 
enforcement was set to 1200 points. This amount equals the maximum gains to be achieved by such 
an intervention and was chosen to make such a change of the nature of the game prohibitively 
costly. For minimum-contributions that were lower than 20, the attached cost was approximated by 
a linear function and thus equaled 60 times the minimum set. On the other end of the cost range are 
simple announcements or advertisements to the players which gave rise to costs of 50 points. A 
detailed listing of the introduced rules and the attached costs is provided in Table B1 in appendix B. 
When an institutional rule was proposed, the experimenters quantified the attached costs. The cost 
scheme was hidden from the groups to avoid an "anchoring effect", but any subject was given the 
possibility to ask for the costs of a specific rule set at all times. We are well-aware that our cost 
estimates are arbitrary and that the chosen rule cost system may influence outcomes. We are all the 
more surprised that the groups maintained a large variety in rule sets in both seminars, yet achieving 
a high standard of rule-cost minimization in the final round. This clearly shows that our system of 
rule costs allowed for a variety of minimal-cost rules, rather than predetermining one particular set 
of rules as a natural winner of the efficiency contest. This is also reflected in the fact that our results 
are not very sensitive to whether we compare rule sets by the average contributions or the efficiency 
they elicited: as we shall see in section IV, the only substantial difference is the standard finding that 
punishment or redistribution as a rule component induces higher contributions but lowers overall 
efficiency. Even so, the ordering of rule sets by contributions or efficiency are similar: for example, 
the best three rule sets in either dimension coincide, and out of the best six sets in terms of one of 
the dimensions, five are among the best six in terms of the other. Therefore, we think that our 
results are relatively robust to changes in the system of rule costs. 
Implementation, play, and feedback 
At the end of the week, each design-group had to hand in a verbal description of their rule set which 
was subsequently implemented in the experimental software z-tree
10 and translated into neutrally-
worded  instructions  by  the  experimenter.
11  After  another  week  we  met  again  for  the  first 
tournament. The subjects of a seminar were randomly allocated to play groups of 4. Each play 
group played under a different rule set developed by the rule design groups. To avoid rule designs 
tailored  to  a  specific  subject  population,  the  play  groups  differed  from  the  design  groups.  To 
guarantee  there  was  enough  incentive  to  create  efficient  rules  and  improve  them  as  best  as 
participants could, we had design groups compete in an efficiency tournament that would partly 
                                                 
10  Fischbacher (2007). 
11  Subjects were given the possibility to have loaded instructions distributed, incurring the same rule costs as on-screen 
announcements during the experiment.    8 
determine the seminar marks for the design group. More precisely, we measured efficiency as the 
sum of individual payoffs within the play group (who also had to bear the costs caused by the rule-
set),  as  a  fraction  of  the  payoffs  in  the  social  optimum.  To  leave  some  room  for  initial 
experimentation, later tournaments were weighted higher than earlier tournaments.  
By the end of each tournament, seminar participants were provided with detailed feedback on the 
performance of all rules within their seminar group by round and group, comprising (i) individual 
contributions, (ii) efficiency, (iii) returns from the public good abstracting from any costs, and (iv) 
variable costs, as well as the instructions for all rule sets.
12 Overall, there were five rounds of play, 
four of them – the tournaments – under rules developed by the design groups. The third (final) 
tournament was weighted two (three) times higher than the first two rule tournaments in terms of 
rule  performance.  In  addition  to  their  rule  sets'  performance,  the  profits  gained  in  students' 
individual play also made up for the seminar mark, so that sabotage of alien rules would be costly to 
the saboteur. Note that individual performance in the different tournaments was weighted evenly. 
As mentioned above, we had the students clearly separated into two distinct groups that met at 
different times, urging them not to communicate with students from the other group on the topic of 
the seminar. This was done to see whether the rule sets would "converge" to similar sets. Not only 
did rules not "converge" to the same set over the seminars; they did not even converge within a 
seminar group.  
Data base 
In our experiment we obtain a data base of 24 rule sets from two seminar groups composed of 12 
participants  each.  The  corresponding  three  rule  groups  in  each  seminar  interacted  in  four 
tournaments. Out of these 24 rule sets, we excluded two for our analysis, leaving us with 22 data 
points.
13 In the following section, we report on what the rule sets looked like, classifying them in 
terms of basic rule components, before we proceed to analyze the development process in more 
detail in sections IV and V. 
 
                                                 
12  Fixed rule costs were stated in the instructions and implied in the efficiency figures. 
13   To ensure that groups had the largest-possible freedom in their pursuit of avenues out of the social dilemma, we 
admitted one group’s idea to transform the game into a minimum-effort game, given the no-contribution equilibrium 
remained. The transformation was done by allowing the rule group to redistribute any contributed points surpassing 
the minimum contribution back to the contributing player before the sum of contributions was multiplied by the 
public-good factor. Nevertheless, this changes the game from being a social dilemma to a coordination game, a 
solution that is not generally applicable to social-dilemma situations and is thus off our research path. We excluded 
this rule set, which was applied by the group in tournament 2 and 3.   9 
III.  Rules used and disregarded rule features 
The rules introduced by our subjects are summarized in table B.1 in appendix B. In that table, we 
briefly describe the rule sets, providing the contribution and efficiency level achieved as well as the 
costs they gave rise to, grouped by the seminar group and the tournament number. In order to have a 
better  understanding  of  what  the  determinants  of  those  rule  sets  were,  we  classified  the  rule 
components along different categories. 
1. Punishment and redistribution 
The role of punishment in social dilemma situations is widely and prominently discussed in the 
literature
14. Although our subjects had at best a very incomplete knowledge of this literature, many 
of the submitted rule sets made use of punishment or redistribution features. Interestingly however, 
only two of them employed a peer-to-peer mechanism. Most often, rules specified the deduction of 
points from the lowest-contributor and, in case of redistributive mechanisms, the reallocation of 
these points in favor of the highest-contributing player. In some of the cases, deducted points were 
transferred to an account that was to be redistributed at the end to the player having contributed the 
most. One rule set had players contribute to the joint account as well as to an ‘administration’ that 
was constituted in a step-level fashion by those contributing to this additional account. In case of 
sufficient contributions to the ‘administration’, its members were allowed to punish non-members 
using a peer-to-peer mechanism. Another set incorporated a ‘warning system’: those contributing 
less than the mean were asked to increase their contributions in the following period. In case this 
advice was not followed, they were punished by an amount conditional on the earlier deviation 
from the mean. Most of the sets, however, had a direct, automatic punishment or redistribution 
mechanism based on contribution ranks, with differentiated punishment of the lower-contributors. 
These  observations  give  rise  to  four  (not  mutually  exclusive)  components  capturing  different 
punishment and redistribution techniques. The components are formulated in such a way that the 
question of whether a rule set satisfies it can unambiguously be answered by yes or no. 
1a. Punishment and redistribution (pun): the rule set provides for either destruction of a part of a 
player i's points (punishment), or a reallocation thereof in favor of at least one other player j 
(redistribution), conditional on i's behavior 
This condition was fulfilled for 75% of all rule sets. Remarkably, in the first tournament, all rule 
sets include either punishment or redistribution, or both. However, only half the sets feature any of 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom, Walker, Gardner (1992), Fehr and Gächter (2000a, 2002), Denant-Boemont et al. 
(2007), Nikiforakis (2008), Carpenter and Matthews (forthc.) for experimental studies, and Henrich and Boyd 
(2001), Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson (2003),  Hauert et al. (2007), Dreber et al. (2008) for theoretical 
approaches.   10 
them in the final tournament, and those that do, use redistribution. In other words, 'pure' punishment 
is no longer observed in the final tournament, but “punishment” through redistribution or rule cost 
assignment conditional on the player’s contribution is. While this could be attributed to details in 
the cost scheme implemented, it cannot be ignored that the frequency of use of these mechanisms 
steadily declines over time.  
To obtain a better understanding of the pun rules, we introduce three further classifying variables, 
the first of which relates to the frequency with which the deduction regimes played a role in the 
game: 
1b.  Punishment  or  redistribution  in  every  period  (punEP):  punishment  or  redistribution  (as 
described in 1a.) takes place in every single round 
This category makes the distinction between rules with roundly punishment or redistribution and 
those implementing them only periodically or even only once. A rule set exhibiting punEP provides 
for roundly deduction of points, a characteristic that was displayed by 13 out of 24 rule sets. In 
terms of rule sets which exhibit characteristic pun, the fraction of rule sets with punEP decreases 
from six out of six (eight out of ten in tournaments one and two) to two out of three (five out of 
eight in tournaments three and four).  
Another distinction can be made with regard to players’ influence on the points to be deducted: 
1c. Redistribution endogeneity (redEnd): punishment or redistribution (as described in 1a.) is 
administered by players themselves rather than automatically 
Most rule sets (16 out of 18 rule sets with pun) proposed by our rule groups deprived the players 
from any influence on the points to be deducted, once the contribution decisions had been taken. 
Only in one instance, punishment was in the form of peer-to-peer punishment as in the typical 
public-good experiments with punishment,
15 and in the other rule set, players contributing more 
than 14 tokens were allowed to jointly decide (through a voting procedure) on the allocation of rule 
costs among the remaining players. 
Finally, we distinguish rules that involve a single, concentrated reward payment at the end of a 
session as a special case of a redistributive rule: 
1d. 'Big bonus' (BB): redistribution takes on the form of a fund paid into and one distributive 
action (the allocation of a 'jackpot') at the end of round 25 
 
                                                 
15  E.g., Fehr and Gächter (2000a, 2002).   11 
Figure 1: Frequency of punishment-or-redistribution characteristics by tournament. 
There were three rule sets that involved roundly payments into a fund that was awarded to the 
highest-contributing player at the end of the respective session (with an equal-split rule in case of a 
tie). All of them were designed by the same rule group. 
The incidence of the rule components summarized under punishment and redistribution over time is 
depicted in Figure 1. As mentioned before, we can see a clear trend away from pun rules, as well as, 
within that category, from rules that prescribe punishment or redistribution to be effective in every 
round. A 'big bonus' was employed by one rule group in all tournaments following the first one, and 
endogenous administration of pun was only introduced twice, by different groups. 
 
2. Feedback on individual behavior 
Several studies (e.g., Milinski, et al., 2006, Sommerfeld, et al., 2007) have shown that reputation-
building opportunities may be very effective in promoting cooperation. A necessary prerequisite for 
being able to build a reputation is having some kind of identity. Bohnet and Frey (1999) show that 
identification alone suffices to increase the degree of pro-social choices in prisoner’s dilemma and 
dictator games. In principle rule sets could allocate identification, e.g. in terms of a fixed player ID 
to subjects, but in our seminars, this happened in a minority of the cases.   12 
2a.  Feedback  on  individual  behavior  (ID):  players  are  informed  not  only  on  the  sum  of 
contributions, but also on individual contributions 
In fact, subjects were provided with identity-based feedback only in one third of all rule sets. The 
remaining two thirds of the rule sets did not provide feedback based on identity numbers, and not 
even on individual contributions. In two cases, players faced a rather special situation we also want 
to separate: players under these two rule-sets did not receive any feedback on contributions at all. 
2b. No feedback on contributions (noFB): the sum of contributions is concealed from the players. 
In both cases, this rule was coupled with a ‘big malus’, a severe punishment action of the lowest-
overall-contributor at the end of the game, unless a pre-specified cumulative contribution level had 
been  achieved  by  the  group.
16  In  the  first  instance  of  the  rule-set,  a  considerable  amount  of 
contributions was achieved (1271 tokens, as compared to the 834 required to circumvent the 'big 
malus'). Not being satisfied by the efficiency achieved, the group modified their rule-set, asking for 
a group-contribution of 1667 tokens, which the play-group failed to comply with by a margin of 
120. The application of the 'big malus' led to a disastrous result in terms of efficiency and the group 
abandoned this strategy. 
3. Communication: subject-to-subject and "lawmaker"-to-“people” (framing) 
Another  tool  that  has  proven  to  be  very  effective  in  inducing  cooperation  in  social-dilemma 
situations  is  communication  (e.g.  Isaac  and  Walker,  1988,  Ostrom,  Gardner  and  Walker,  1994, 
Cason and Khan, 1999, or Brosig, Weimann and Ockenfels, 2003). Therefore, we would not have 
been surprised if our seminar participants had included elements of communication in their rule 
sets, such as a pre-play chat, or the selection and subsequent distribution of pre-specified messages. 
3a. Communication (comm): there is some form of communication between players, e.g. in form 
of a signaling opportunity such as in cheap-talk agreements 
To our surprise, rule sets rarely provided for signaling opportunities, and no group implemented an 
open-communication component in the form of a virtual chat-room. Only in the final tournament, 
one rule group in each seminar opted to allow players to engage in signaling behavior through a 
unanimity vote on a (non-binding) covenant, with roundly renewal (contingent on that there have 
not been more than two breaches in the past) and requiring subjects to contribute fully in one case, 
and periodical votes coupled with a proposed minimum of 15 tokens in the other.
17 
                                                 
16   We do not introduce an additional 'big malus' category, as the two rule-sets are already uniquely classified by the 
noFB category. No other rule-set employed a 'big malus', and thus, such a category would not add any information. 
17  The latter rule group envisaged the possibility of changing the minimum requirement in case of general adherence to 
the covenant; however, their covenant did not succeed in inducing the expected cooperation.   13 
While it has been shown that framing can substantially influence behavior in public-good games 
(Ross and Ward (1996); Cookson (2000); for a different conclusion, see Rutte, Wilke and Messick 
(1987);  Rege  and  Telle  (2004)),  we  did  not  expect  our  subjects  to  make  an  attempt  at 
contextualizing  the  situation.  Even  neglecting  the  studies  not  finding  a  framing  effect,  we  had 
reason to believe so: all subjects were – by then – experienced players of a laboratory public good 
and  this  was  common  knowledge.  Furthermore,  they  knew  (as  players)  that  the  framing  was 
artificially imposed and had no relevance to the game actually played (for seminar marks). 
3b. Some frame (frame): the game is played after the issuing of an appeal (to moral sentiments, 
the advantageousness of the social optimum, or general social-welfare considerations), with a 
background story, or even with feedback conditional on behavior 
Contrary to our expectations, less than half of all rule sets did without a framing (13 out of 24 had 
some framing). Rule components classified as falling into this category include priming attempts, 
such as the display of roundly changing statements similar to “One cannot live without trusting 
others”. Further, they include individual feedback conditional on behavior such as messages “To 
live means believing in something. In our case, in the community, thanks for that!” in case of a full 
contribution. Or framing in the narrower sense, embedding the contribution decision in contexts like 
the building of a school in Afghanistan or public goods arising in a local neighborhood. 
To further distinguish rules making use of a frame component, we separate those containing a one-
time appeal at the beginning only from those envisaging repeated messages. 
3b. Frame in every period (frameEP): an appeal, a background story, or behavior-conditional 
feedback is displayed in every single round. 
Out of the 13 rule-sets containing a frame, six also had frameEP as a characteristic. 
4. Participative elements 
Experimental studies like Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) and Tyran and Feld (2006) have 
shown  that  increased  participation  opportunities  lead  to  more  cooperative  outcomes.  We  were 
curious  to  find  out  whether  our  subjects  would  anticipate  this  and  implement  features  of 
endogenous rule adaption or even rule change.  
4. Endogeneity (end): the rule-set provides for institutional change as a consequence of either 
player behavior or a vote   14 
Figure 2: The use of communicative and participative elements over time. 
Indeed, such features are used increasingly towards the end, however, only one fifth of all rule sets 
contain  them  and  in  one  of  the  seminar  groups,  such  elements  are  introduced  only  in  the  last 
tournament. Examples of endogenous rule features are a vote on removing any features that go 
beyond the basic game after the eighth round or the introduction of peer punishment contingent on 
players paying for a monitoring institution. 
Figure 2 illustrates the occurrence of rule components 2. to 4. over the course of the seminar. As has 
been  stated  before,  individual  feedback  was  not  a  widespread  rule  component,  exhibiting  a 
downward trend over the four tournaments. Frames or appeals and endogenous rule changes, on the 
other hand, were used increasingly, while communicative elements where only introduced in the 
last tournament by two out of six groups. 
In  Table  2,  we  summarize  the  frequencies  of  usage  of  the  different  components  and  pair-wise 
combinations thereof. Note that the components are not mutually exclusive, and, in the case of the 
sub-categories of punishment or redistribution (i.e., punEP, redEnd, and BB), even contingent on 
the  main  category  (pun).  Therefore,  the  sum  of  border  totals  does  not  convey  any  sensibly 
interpretable information.
18 Furthermore, note that our color shading always refers to the frequency 
                                                 
18 If it was not for the contingencies among the punishment and redistribution components, the sum of border totals   15 
of the component combination as a percentage of the row component’s incidence. If, for example, 
the cell (BB, pun) wears an orange coloring, this is owed to the fact that all BB rules are also pun 
rules by definition. On the other hand, the turquoise shading of cell (pun, BB) marks that the three 
BB rules only account for roughly the sixth part of all pun rules. 
What  can  be  seen  from  Table  2  is  that  communication  (comm)  is  never  combined  with  a 
punishment-or-redistribution  (pun)  nor  an  individual-feedback  (ID)  component  and  that  no 
feedback (noFB) is only combined with framing (in half of the cases), apart from the 'big malus' 
reported above. One finding that comes as a surprise is that feedback on individual behavior (ID) 
never goes together with a frame in every period (frameEP) and ID and some frame (frame) go 
together only once, even though neither category is extremely rare among the rule sets. Thus those 
engaging in the psychological techniques of framing, priming, and appealing explicitly chose to 
render others’ individual behavior opaque.  
Punishment and redistribution Feedback on Communication Particip. TOTAL
individual behavior elements
pun punEP redEnd BB ID noFB comm frame frameEP end
pun 12 2 3 8 2 0 6 3 3 17
punEP 12 1 3 5 0 0 5 3 1 12
redEnd 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
BB 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 3
ID 8 5 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 8
noFB 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
comm 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2
frame 6 5 0 3 1 1 2 6 2 11
frameEP 3 3 0 2 0 0 1 6 1 6
end 3 1 2 0 2 0 2 2 1 5
TOTAL 17 12 2 3 8 2 2 11 6 5 22
 
Table 2: Usage of rule-set components (border totals) and pair-wise contingencies; colors highlight 
the frequency of the component combination as a percentage of the row component’s incidence: 0-
10% (blue), 10-40% (turquoise), 40-60% (green), 60-90% (yellow), 90-100% (orange). 
A table classifying the different rule sets according to our characteristics can be found in Appendix 
B (see Table B2). The classification is also used for the typicity analysis reported in section V.
19  
Before we do so, we explore the performance of rules exhibiting a certain component, in order to 
assess whether the rule-adjustment process went 'in the right direction' in section IV.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
divided by the number of rule sets would be interpretable as the average number of rule components employed. 
19 To run a typicity analysis, characteristics displayed by less than half of all strategies have to be reverted (such that, 
e.g., ID becomes noID, i.e., "subjects are not informed on individual contributions but only on their sum"), for 
technical reasons outlined in Kuon (1993).   16 
IV. Rule performance and rule adaptation 
In the preceding section, we categorized subjects' rule sets and established the frequencies with 
which  rule  components  were  used  in  the  different  tournaments.  In  this  section,  we  set  out  to 
evaluate those components' contribution to the performance of the rule set they are incorporated in. 
Figure 3 gives a first hint at an answer, displaying boxplots of the efficiency levels achieved by all 
rule-sets  employing  a  certain  component.  Judging  by  Figure  3,  one  may  argue  that  having 
characteristics  like  BB,  comm,  and  frameEP  in  one’s  rule  set  seems  to  be  a  good  idea,  while 
employing noFB does not seem to lead to a good performance. To examine this conjecture more 
closely, we analyze our rule-sets using a simple distribution-free measure of success. We rank the 
rule sets by efficiency (with the highest rank corresponding to the highest efficiency) and calculate 
the average rank of all rule sets displaying a certain characteristic. Comparing this to the median 
rank of all rule sets provides us with an index for the discriminatory power of the component. 
Division by (n-1)/2, where n is the total number of rule sets, finally normalizes the index to lie 
within the interval [-1,1]. An index of 1 implies that only the best-performing rule set displays this 
component, while an index of -1 means that the characteristic is only made use of by the worst-
performing rule set. A characteristic that is employed in every strategy would lead to an index of 0, 
as would any component for which the sum of rank deviations from the median above the median is 
equal to the sum of those below it. If Ri denotes the rank of rule set i, and Yj is the set of all rule sets 
that exhibit characteristic j, our index ρj can be expressed as follows: 
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This index is a rather simple approach assuming a linear separability of the performance of rule 
sets, neglecting any interaction effects between rule components. Note further that the indices are 
based  on  a  relative  ranking  of  marginal  component  effects,  and  can  therefore  only  explain 
deviations from the median efficiency rank. Nevertheless, a virtual rank ordering of rule sets by 
simply adding up the components' ρj yields a surprisingly good prediction for the rank ordering by 
efficiency: the Spearman correlation coefficient between the two rankings is rs = 0.55 (p < 0.01).
20 
If we take into account that not all components contribute to efficiency to the same extend, this is a 
surprisingly  high  correlation.
21  In  Figure  4,  we  depict  the  indices  for  our  rule  characteristics, 
                                                 
20 Applying this analysis to the final tournament only yields a correlation coefficient of rs = 0.89 (p = 0.0333). 
21  Running a mixed-effects estimate of normalised rank deviations from the median rank on the indices (with random 
effects for rounds, the interaction of rounds and seminar group, and rule groups), the rank correlation between the 
ensuing fitted ranks and the true ranks can be driven up further (rs = 0.90, p < 0.001).    17 
grouped by tournaments. The three components that seem to boast efficiency the most seem to be 
the  use  of  framing,  not  providing  subjects  with  feedback  on  individual  contributions,  and 
accentuating the supergame characteristic through a 'big bonus'. In contrast, a 'big malus' as in the 
case of the noFB rules seems to be counterproductive. While the indices for pun features other than 
a 'big bonus' do not seem to make up a clear picture across tournaments, this is notably different in 
the final tournament. It seems that our subjects have learnt to design efficient pun mechanisms by 
the end of the experiment. On the other hand, we see that the seemingly successful mechanisms of 
framing and communication (Figure 4c) do not perform as well compared to final-tournament pun 
rules (Figure 4b). When compared to rule-sets from other rounds, however, they still score above 
average. 
 
Figure 3: Boxplots of achieved efficiency levels, by rule components 
Contrasting  the  efficiency-based  indices  in  Figure  4  to  their  contribution-based  counterparts 
depicted in Figure 5, we see that the main difference lies in that the frameEP components lose their 
positive influence, while noFB switches sides, which is at least in part owed to the realization of the 
'big malus' in one of the two cases. This suggests that the frameEP characteristics are not the most 
cooperation-enhancing per se, but that they achieve the amount of cooperation they induce in the 
most cost-efficient manner for our given rule-cost scheme. What may come as a surprise is that the   18 
increase in the pun mechanisms’ performance is rather limited. While we are well-aware that the 
cost  scheme  we  implemented  may  be  prone  to  errors,  the  similarity  of  the  indices  based  on 
efficiency and contributions may in our view be interpreted as a sign of robustness of our rule-cost 
scheme. 
 
Figure 4: rule-component efficiency indices a) for tournaments 1-3 (upper panel), b) for tournament 
4 (middle panel)), and c) for all tournaments (lower panel)). The numbers of rule-sets having a 
component are given in parentheses; if none, the index was omitted. 
Based on our indices as a – however imperfect – measure of success, let us take a look at the rule 
changes over the tournaments as depicted in Figures 1 and 2. We observe that (i) punishment and 
redistribution systems lead to low efficiency (and only slightly higher contributions) unless they 
come with a 'big bonus', which corresponds with the trend away from such mechanisms. The fact 
that the decline in the use of pun is slow and only partial is surprising especially in seminar I, where 
there was one rule group that managed to achieve the highest degree of efficiency within their 
seminar in three out of four tournaments - using rules that did not contain either punishment or   19 
redistribution. In fact, this was the only rule group to renounce the use of the pun component within 
this seminar group. In other words, participants in the remaining rule groups fail to recognize that 
not  making  use  of  punishment  may  actually  be  a  competitive  advantage:  even  in  view  of  the 
superior  results  achieved  by  their  competitor  group,  they  fail  to  mirror  that  group's  superior 
strategy.
22 In seminar  II, rule sets abstaining from a ’monetary’ sanctioning of behavior do not 
perform as well; in two out of three instances, they achieve only the second highest efficiency, the 
third set following one of the two just mentioned on third place.  
 
Figure  5:  Rule-component  contribution  indices  a)  for  tournaments  1-3  (upper  panel)),  b)  for 
tournament 4 (middle panel)), and c) for all tournaments (lower panel)). The numbers of rule-sets 
having a component are given in parentheses; if none, the index was omitted. 
                                                 
22  This reluctance to follow the good example of their competitor group could, of course, easily be explained by 
postulating a psychological bias to focus on contributions. However, from our discussions with the subjects we got 
the impression that they were well-aware of the fact that high(er) contribution averages do not necessarily lead to 
higher efficiency, but have to be measured against potentially increasing rule costs.   20 
In the end, is the use of punishment a bad idea? Maybe not: pun mechanisms as designed in the last 
round  (i.e.,  redistribution  of  rule  costs  as  the  only  such  mechanism)  increase  efficiency.
23 
Furthermore,  rules  employing  punishment  or  redistribution  in  every  single  round  (punEP) 
consistently  and  increasingly  outperform  others  (ρpunEP,2  =  ρpunEP,3  =  0.25,  ρpunEP,4  =  0.6,    for 
tournaments two through four; for the first round, there is no such difference as all rule sets exhibit 
punEP). Adding the generally negative impact of pun, the findings suggest there may be a U-shaped 
productivity  of  punishment  and  redistribution  in  terms  of  application  frequency,  yielding  best 
results for either roundly punishment or redistribution, or none at all. Nevertheless, the fraction of 
rule sets using punEP decreases over time. Finally, the use of a ‘big bonus’ at the end of the 25 
rounds, making the supergame characteristic more salient, clearly seems to enhance performance, 
with an overall index of ρBB = 0.75. Nonetheless, only one of the six rule groups used this rule 
component. Looking at the general picture, what we can learn from our lawmaker's responses is that 
the effects of punishment are far from being obvious and understood. 
From Figure 2, we know that the use of ID-based feedback tends to decline over time. Figure 4 
shows that this is not as surprising as it may seem: the corresponding index for the first three rounds 
is ρID,1-3 = -0.22. Hence, ID-based feedback does not seem to have a positive effect on cooperation 
as long as there is no explicit award or commendation, or the possibility to be rewarded in an 
ancillary game as e.g. in Milinski, et al. (2006). Correspondingly, we observe the stated trend away 
from ID, with three rule sets having the component in the first and five sets in the final tournament. 
The abolition of the combination of noFB with a 'big malus' is easily explained by the fact that this 
attempt led to the lowest efficiency within that seminar group on both occasions it was made use of. 
Turning to components with some communicative element, be it between subjects or between the 
'lawmakers' and their 'people', we observe the following: the results of the two rule sets allowing for 
signaling do not allow for a clear conclusion, finding its expression in the corresponding index of 
ρcomm,4 = 0 despite an overall index of ρcomm = 0.38. While one of them led to 87.4 % of the possible 
efficiency (70.1 % of possible contributions), the latter obtained only 68.8 % (20.9 %), compared to 
an overall average of 71.1 % (51.1 %). On the other hand, rule groups implementing a frame were 
correct in doing so, judging by their success: the implementation of some form of framing, be it a 
moral appeal or a story of building a school in Afghanistan and behavior-contingent feedback ("You 
did a good job on this one. The citizens of Kandahar are watching you with enthusiasm and getting 
you some fresh water."), led to indices of ρframe = 0.30. This is reflected in the slight trend towards 
framing, with two rule sets in the first tournament, and three or four sets ever after. However, 
                                                 
23  Unfortunately, a meaningful statistical comparison using e.g. conditional average payoffs is not possible, given rules 
containing a feature and those not containing this feature within a seminar group are not independent.   21 
subjects do not seem to have noticed that rule sets employing the framing in every period tended to 
perform even slightly better (ρframeEP = 0.35): in the final round we only observe one such set. 
Finally, having the 'people' participate in the shaping of their world through endogenous features 
tends to foster efficiency (ρend = 0.24), while the figures for contributions are ambiguous: in the first 
round, ρ
cont
end 1 ,  = 0.6, while in the last round, ρ
cont
end 4 ,  = - 0.2. Note, however, that we only observe two 
rule sets containing the end characteristic. 
Do 'lawmakers' change their rules for the better? 
The  final  tournament  was  the  most  decisive  for  the  students’  success  in  the  seminar  and  the 
intermediate tournaments were meant to improve the rule sets and their lower weights in the final 
grading enable experimentation. Participants have successfully used this opportunity. The median 
efficiency from the third to the fourth (final) tournament increases significantly (p34 = 0.0625, pair-
wise two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, where pxy denotes the p-value for the test between 
tournament x and y), whereas it does not between the first and the second and between the second 
and the third, respectively (p12 = 0.3125 and p23 = 0.625). What did the rule groups do to achieve 
this improvement? To find an answer to this question and possibly shed some light on typical 
mistakes and typical improvements, we performed a typicity analysis based on the characteristics 
introduced in section III. 
 
V. Typicity analysis 
The preceding analyses considered the rule components in isolation and estimated their contribution 
to  the  rules’  efficiency.  In  the  following  we  analyze  the  interdependencies  of  the  rule  sets’ 
characteristics  with  a  typicity  analysis.  This  type  of  analysis,  introduced  by  Kuon  (1993)  and 
successfully implemented e.g. by Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997), is used to determine what a 
'typical strategy' or, in our case, a 'typical rule set' is and what the typical characteristics of these 
rule sets are. The two measures are interdependently intertwined: the typical rule sets are the ones 
that carry the typical characteristics and the typical characteristics are the ones that occur in typical 
strategies. Technically the typicity analysis is the solution of an Eigen value problem, providing 
weights for the rule sets and the characteristics. Typicities of characteristics add up to one and are 
all equal to one divided by the number of characteristics if the number of strategies containing each 
of these features is the same, such that the reciprocal value of the number of characteristics forms 
the natural reference point against which typicities may be evaluated. On the other hand, the more 
typical a rule set's features are, the more typical is the rule set itself. More precisely, the typicity of a   22 
rule  set  is  the  sum  of  its  characteristics'  typicities.
24  Once  the  typicities  of  rule  sets  and 
characteristics  are  established,  we  can  look  for  whether  typicity  is  in  any  way  correlated  with 
efficiency and thus assess how well-targeted our subjects were in terms of their search for better 
solutions. Given we have found rule sets in the final tournament to perform better than those in the 
preceding tournaments, we run two distinct analyses for these two sets and compare their typicities 
to find out how the typical rule sets differed. Table 3 lists the corresponding component typicities. 
pun punEP noRedEnd noBB noID FB noComm frame noFrameEP noEnd
ρ [j,1-3] -0.086 0.040 -0.019 -0.114 0.170 0.038 0.000 0.448 -0.212 -0.019
ρ [j,4] 0.333 0.600 0.000 -0.200 -0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.120 0.067
Typicity in trnmts 1-3 0.113 0.085 0.115 0.111 0.076 0.113 0.127 0.057 0.089 0.115
Typicity in trnmt 4 0.073 0.050 0.136 0.110 0.113 0.136 0.098 0.090 0.119 0.075
 
Table 3: Performance indices, as introduced in section IV (lines 1 and 2); rule component typicities 
over the first three and the final tournament (lines 3 and 4). Note that some characteristics have 
been  reverted  for  the  purpose  of  the  typicity  analysis,  because  –  for  technical  reasons  –  the 
characteristics have to be formulated such that the majority of rule sets carry it. Therefore, for 
example redEnd has to be reverted into noRedEnd, and BB has to be reverted into noBB. The 
performance indices reported in lines 1 and 2 correspond to the changed component formulation 
and may hence be different from those reported above. 
What we see in Table 3 is that the change in rule component typicities largely corresponds to the 
frequency changes we know from Figures 1 and 2. Also from Table 3, we observe that a positive 
component  performance  in  tournaments  1  to  3  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
component’s typicity. Furthermore, we find an increasing diversity in rule sets: average rule-set 
typicity declines from 0.888 in the first tournament to 0.773 in the final one even if we base these 
averages upon final-tournament typicities. This is a clear sign of a 'divergence' of rule sets. In light 
of this fact, a new question arises: is there a 'common denominator' in the sense of a typical rule set, 
as a paradigmatic institutional setting to employ? 
Is the typical rule set a good choice for a (benevolent) lawmaker? 
In Table 4, we present the correlations between rule typicity, on the one hand, and contributions and 
efficiency, on the other. What we see is that overall, there is no correlation of rule typicity with 
either contributions or efficiency. This statement has to be qualified slightly, as the typical rule set 
seems to improve over time, even if none of the correlations becomes significantly different from 
zero. 
                                                 
24  For a thorough discussion of the mathematical properties of this method, cf. Kuon (1993).   23 
 
Correlations 
between... 
rule typicity and contributions 
(p-value) 
rule typicity and efficiency 
(p-value) 
 
Overall  0.010 (0.964)  -0.185 (0.410) 
 
 
- 0.235 (0.653)  - 0.059 (0.912)  1
st tourn. 
 - 0.200 (0.783)  - 0.500 (0.450)  2
nd tourn.  Tournament 1 - 3  - 0.133 (0.623) 
  0.300 (0.683) 
 - 0.217 (0.419) 
  0.500 (0.450)  3
rd tourn. 
Tournament 4    0.257 (0.658)    0.086 (0.919)  4
th tourn. 
 
Table 4: Correlations of contributions and efficiency with rule typicity 
The lack of a correlation between rule typicity and efficiency may be due to the presence of initial 
“typical mistakes” that are only hesitatingly done away with. Most prominently, and as already 
discussed in section IV, the use of pun seemed to generally decrease efficiency, as did the non-use 
of  a  'big  bonus'  if  a  pun  regime  was  introduced.  What  is  most  surprising,  once  again,  is  the 
reluctance of rule groups to follow the better example of other rule groups obtaining better results 
by not committing these mistakes.
25 
Notwithstanding, the redistribution rules of the final round are far more cost-effective, and thus, 
efficient  than  their  predecessors. As  “typical  improvements”  we  would  classify  the  increasing 
typicity  of  framing  and  the  decline  in  the  typicity  of  ID-based  feedback.  Finally,  signaling 
opportunities are introduced in the final round, while open communication, leadership arrangements 
or opportunities for ostracism are not.  
The (tentative) rule of choice 
What would be the rule of choice were we to construct one solely based on our analysis? There 
would be a redistribution mechanism that is active in every round; its proceeds would (partially, if 
not completely) go into a 'jackpot' that is to be awarded to the player contributing most over time. 
There would be no identity-based feedback but an exchange of declarations of intent. Finally, we 
would try to activate social norms by some framing with individual, behavior-conditioned feedback 
messages. Such a rule would be very close to that used by rule group 4 in tournaments 2 and 3 and 
would have a typicity of about 77 %. The difference to the two observed rule-sets is the addition of 
an exchange of declarations of intent. Of course, such a “cocktail” of rule components may have to 
pay tribute to the possibility that combining rule features may lead to crowding-out effects, as e.g. 
Reeson and Tisdell (2008) have found for the combination of suasion (categorized as framing in our 
study) with a minimum contribution. 
                                                 
25  As has been discussed before, in seminar I, we would have expected rule groups to copy the abstention of pun 
regimes, while in seminar II, it seemed to be most obvious after the second tournament that a 'big bonus' was a good 
way to go.   24 
VI. Discussion and Implications 
This paper reports on a novel approach in studying institutional frameworks to overcome social 
dilemmas.  The  novelty  of  the  approach  lies  in  completely  transferring  the  institutional  design 
process  to  the  subjects.  Previous  studies  have  either  confronted  subjects  with  predefined 
institutional rules or given them the choice within an experimenter-defined rule set. The present 
approach allows us to study the emergence and development of institutional rules when subjects are 
unbound by any rule pre-specifications. We make three remarkable observations. First, punishment, 
in  various  disguises,  was  the  initial  focal  point  of  all  groups.  This  is  noteworthy  because 
punishment is an extensively studied mechanism in the literature and this result is a clear support 
for the importance of punishment rules in public goods settings. Remarkably, however, punishment 
mechanisms were not designed in the  form of  peer punishment, but rather in the form of pre-
specified rules of deduction and/or redistribution contingent on complying with provision targets. 
These provision targets were either fixed levels (e.g. full provision) or contingent on the other group 
members (e.g. not being the lowest-contributing player).  
A  second  important  observation,  namely  the  role  of  framing,  is  rather  unexpected.  This  is 
noteworthy because subjects playing under these rule sets were experienced players, who, in their 
capacity as "lawmakers", have a relatively deep understanding of the logic of the game and were 
completely aware that the chosen frames have no connection to reality whatsoever, but are pure 
imagination. Nonetheless, framing was increasingly chosen and a successful means in achieving 
efficiency. While  one  of  the  groups  opted  to  tell  its  subjects  the  public  good  was  a  school  in 
Afghanistan  in  two  of  the  tournaments,  another  group  had  its  subjects  play  in  a  virtual 
neighborhood consisting of spouses and children, cats, dogs, and rat poison. Yet other rule sets 
displayed a "slogan of the round" such as: "Only within the community, people are beings conscious 
of their strength", or moral appeals directly asking subjects to contribute. What this tells us is that 
attempts at activating social norms through appeals or even general moral statements tend to be 
more than "just words": they seem to foster cooperation even amongst case-hardened addressees. 
The third noteworthy finding is that subjects render information on a player’s fellow providers 
rather opaque - and that this tends to be a successful strategy. The implications are not straight 
forward and call for further research. Conditionally cooperative subjects are assumed to align their 
provision with what they believe others will contribute. Providing them with detailed information 
on past contributions of their peers may yield the most precise basis for the calculations. Yet, it 
seems  that  a  certain  degree  of  opaqueness  by  just  providing  the  average  contribution  is  more 
successful in enhancing cooperation. A possible explanation may be that the reduced information   25 
precludes individual comparisons detecting advantageous as well as disadvantageous inequalities 
with respect to the other players. Even if these comparisons do not lead to equilibrium predictions 
different from the Nash equilibrium resting on the assumption of money maximizing actors, they 
may  be  important  determinants  of  contribution  dynamics.  Engel  and  Rockenbach  (2009)  find 
individual payoff comparisons, and in particular experienced disadvantageous inequality to be a 
major source for the decline of contributions. 
Interestingly,  we  also  see  prominent  rules  not  used  by  subjects.  Leadership  opportunities  and 
ostracism were not present in the rule sets at all. Additionally we find that communication is not 
used apart from scarce attempts to provide for cheap-talk signaling opportunities, such as non-
binding ‘contracts’ specifying a contribution with the threat of abolishing the ‘contracting’ option 
after the third breach of agreement. Open communication, having proven to be a very effective 
mechanism in resolving social dilemma situations,
26 was not introduced at all. When we asked for 
the underlying reasons at the final meeting of the seminar, we were told communication was not 
introduced because subjects thought it would not work and it would cost too much. In other words, 
it  would  seem  this  very  effective  mechanism  is  not  trusted  enough  to  give  it  a  try  in  a  tense 
situation. 
What  are  the  implications  of  our  study?  Subjects  design  centralized  punishment  regimes. 
Interestingly,  these  regimes  have  so  far  been  largely  neglected  in  the  experimental  literature. 
Notable exceptions are Guillen, Schwieren, and Staffiero (2007), looking at a step-level public good 
with  multiple  (cooperative)  equilibria,  and,  more  relevant  to  the  present  study, Tyran  and  Feld 
(2006) who address the question of whether a “mild law”, i.e., a punishment mechanism that is too 
weak to enforce cooperation, may nevertheless lead to a high level of contributions. They find two 
remarkable effects: (i) “mild law” does not lead to higher cooperation rates if exogenously imposed, 
but (ii) when endogenously introduced, cooperation is boosted. The first observation fits nicely with 
the limited success punishment regimes have in fostering contribution levels in our setting, the 
second may hint at the reasons for that. With two exceptions, rule groups introduce “mild law” 
centralized enforcement institutions without conveying their subjects an opportunity to change this 
institution. In other word, the introduction is endogenous with respect to the rule group only. On the 
other hand, the two punishment regimes involving endogenous features (the possibility of removing 
the institution by majority vote, for instance) seem to perform worse in our study. In light of this 
fact, further research on the issue seems necessary. 
Our second main finding, the frequent and successful use of framing in an environment of case-
                                                 
26   E.g., cf. Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992), or Brosig, Weimann and Ockenfels (2003).   26 
hardened  players,  is  particularly  strong  and  has  several  important  implications.  One  is  that  the 
neutral frame commonly used in laboratory studies may lead to a biased estimate compared to 
cooperation in real-life settings. While most ‘framing experiments’ in the economics literature tend 
to examine presentation effects, such as the contrasting of a ‘public good’ game with an equivalent 
‘public bad’ game in Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1998) or the juxtaposition of a positive-
frame investment in the public good and a negative-frame purchase of the private good in Andreoni 
(1995), there has also been research on contextualization. Cookson (2000), for example, shows that 
already having subjects calculate the effects of an action on group income rather than individual 
payoff can increase cooperation significantly. Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004), on the other 
hand, show just how important the context is. Building on older psychological research, they have 
subjects  play  identical  prisoner’s  dilemma  games,  named  either  the  “Wall  Street  Game”  or  the 
“Community Game”. What makes their findings extraordinarily strong is that, while the context 
played a very substantial role, the players’ behavior in real-life situations – as seen through others 
knowing them well – did not matter at all: people who were expected by others to default were no 
less likely to cooperate than those who were expected to do so. In other words, and relating it to our 
study,  context  seems  to  play  so  important  a  role  that  it  works  even  when  players  know  it  is 
completely artificial. Bearing in mind the many things we see in commercials that are obviously 
and completely unrelated to the promoted product, this may not be such a big surprise, after all. 
The low fraction of rule sets making use of detailed feedback on individual contributions, finally, 
points to yet another issue that has not been tackled by experimenters. While we know from Croson 
(2001) that individual feedback in the voluntary-contributions mechanism does not change average 
contributions but does increase their variance, in a step-level public good Croson and Marks (1998) 
find  decreasing  average  contributions  for  detailed  but  anonymous  information  on  others’ 
contributions. When individual contributions are displayed alongside constant player-IDs, average 
contributions  increase.  In  other  words,  feedback  matters.
27  However,  in  a  standard  game  with 
punishment, the effects of different types of feedback are still unknown. In public-good games with 
peer-to-peer punishment, detailed feedback is essential, but in a central-authority setting, this is no 
longer the case. Out of the studies using a centralized mechanism, Tyran and Feld (2006) do not 
give any feedback at all, while Guillen, Schwieren, and Staffiero (2007) do not give individual 
feedback. In other words, in terms of the feedback provided, neither allows for a comparison with 
existing peer-punishment studies. It is left to further research what role ID-based feedback may play 
in a public-good game with centralized punishment. 
                                                 
27 Another example fort he importance of feedback can be seen in a recent study by Nikiforakis (2009), who studies the 
effect of providing ID-based payoff information as opposed to information on individual contributions. He finds that 
in the payoff condition, contributions are significantly lower.   27 
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Appendices 
A1. Information on the course of the seminar 
Welcome to our simulation-game seminar “social dilemma”! 
During  this  semester,  you  will  have  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  a  business-game  type  of 
seminar.  First,  you  will  gain  experience  in  interacting  with  other  seminar  participants  in  the 
particular “game situation”. Afterwards, you will develop “sets of rules” for the game situation 
within groups, gain experience with implementing these rules, and have the opportunity to refine 
these rules. 
Schedule: 
1
st appointment, 19
th april, preliminary meeting: 
Today we will clarify two things, above all: which tasks you are expected to comply with in 
this seminar, and how your grade is going to be composed based on this. 
2
nd appointment, 26
th april, 1
st round of play: 
After being handed out the instructions for the game, you will gain first experience with 
playing the game in randomly allotted groups. Furthermore, you will be randomly divided 
into groups of 4 in which you will have the opportunity to successively develop a set of rules 
for the game situation during the weeks to come. For simplicity, we will call these sets of 
rules “virtual rooms” (vRoom). Please appoint a contact person for your group by 3
rd May, 
whose contact details are given to us for possible enquiry calls. 
Important note: You will be randomly allotted to a vRoom in each round of play, and you 
will not know with whom you are interacting in a vRoom in any of the rounds. 
3
rd appointment, 3
rd May, 1
st closing date: 
Handing in the rule set by midnight of the respective day; rules are to be handed in including 
a documentation in which you shortly (max. 2 pages) expose your deliberations on the set of 
rules handed in. 
4
th appointment, 10
th May, 2
nd round of play (single-weightet): 
  First-time play in the newly-designed vRooms; you will, again, be randomly assigned to 
your respective vRoom, and therefore, you cannot count on playing with the same people as the 
week before, nor with other members of your rule group. 
5
th appointment, 17
th May, Ascension Day; handing-in of the 2
nd rule set   31 
6
th appointment, 24
th May, 3
rd round of play (single-weighted) 
7
th appointment, 31
st May, handing-in of the 3
rd rule set 
8
th appointment, 7
th June, 4
th round of play (double-weighted) 
9
th appointment, 14
th June, handing-in of the 4
th rule set 
10
th appointment, 21
st June, 5
th round of play (final round) (triple-weighted) 
11
th appointment, 12
th July, final discussion in the large group 
12
th appointment, 31
st July, handing-in of the field reports 
Your tasks: 
-  participating on all appointed days is an absolute necessity for this seminar, as otherwise 
there cannot be any play in at least one vRoom! In case of severe illnesses, we ask for the 
earliest possible notification! 
-  active participation in 5 rounds of play 
-  active  participation  in  designing  a  rule  set  for  the  game  situation. Additionally,  a  short 
motivation for your rule set. (Group task) 
-  preparation of a seminar paper in which you analyse your experience made in the seminar 
and in which you concludingly evaluate your rule set. (Individual task) 
Composition of your grade: 
-  seminar paper and documentation of the rule sets: 40% 
-  individual play: 30% 
-  performance of your group’s rule set in the efficiency tournament: 20% 
-  final discussion: 10% 
 
The efficiency tournament of rule sets (vRooms): 
Efficiency will be defined as follows: the sum of individual payoffs within the vRoom minus rule-
set costs as a fraction of the sum of maximum possible payoffs without rule set. I.e., if players “do 
very well” under your rule set, you will earn points in the efficiency tournament of vRooms. In 
order not to give you any incentive to play “worse” in vRooms of others, your individual payoffs 
from the round of play are also taken into account for your grade. 
Note, furthermore, that the efficiency that emerges in your vRoom during rounds of play 2 and 3   32 
will  contribute  to  your  overall  score  in  the  efficiency  tournament  single-weightedly,  while 
efficiency gained in rounds 4 and 5 will be weighted twice and three times, respectively. This is not 
the case for individual payoffs.  
What is a “rule set”, what does its implementation cost, and which rule sets are feasible? 
To start with, a “rule set” is everything that could be introduced to induce the players to perform 
actions that increase the total sum of contributions in the corresponding vRoom. Exceptions are 
technically unfeasible changes (or those that are feasible only under prohibitively large costs, as e.g. 
to  transfer  the  laboratory  to  the  attic,  providing  it  with  a  glass  cupola),  as  well  as  ethically 
questionable practices (shoot other players, cut their hands off). Additionally, rules are excluded, 
that make inferences about the true identity of players feasible.  
As in “real life”, there is one thing to think about: “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch” – every 
rule to be introduced gives rise to specific costs that will be taxed by us according to the difficulties 
the introduction/implementation of the rule would entail in “real life”.  
In  addition  to  the  dates  appointed  above,  each  group  should  arrange  with  Mr  Wolff  for  a 
consultation  hour  on  the  Tuesday  or  Wednesday  preceding  each  handing-in  of  the  rule  sets  to 
discuss the costs of any potential rule set and to find out whether specific rule changes are not 
possible  due  to  technical,  ethical,  or  other  reasons,  and  to  thus  be  able  to  change  the  rule  set 
accordingly  in  this  case.  It  is  up  to  you  to  decide  on  how  many  group  members  go  to  these 
consultation meetings. 
 
A2. Instructions for the basic game 
Instructions for the experiment 
General Information:  
At the beginning you will be randomly assigned to 3 groups of 4 participants. You will not be 
informed about the identity of the other group members.  
Course of Action:  
In every round, you will be given an endowment of 20 points you can invest in a common project. 
You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute to the project. You will 
keep the remaining tokens. 
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1:  
Your period payoff consists of two components:   33 
·  tokens you have kept = endowment – your contribution to the project 
·  earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / number 
of group members 
Thus, your period payoff amounts to: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of group members 
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group member. The 
total payoff from the experiment is composed of the sum of period payoffs from all 25 rounds. 
Payoff scores will remain anonymous, i.e. no participant will be informed of the payoff score of any 
other participant. 
Please notice:  
Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a question please raise 
your hand out of the cabin. We will then come to you and answer your question privately. 
Good luck! Table B1: summary of all rule sets with elicited contribution levels, achieved efficiency and costs, according to seminar, group, and tournament round 
 
Seminar  Grp  Tournament 1  Contributions  Efficiency  Costs 
(variable 
costs) 
Tournament 2  Contributions  Efficiency  Costs (variable 
costs) 
1  - endogenous state authority 
- punishment 
- endogenous redistribution 
- ID 
825  2277  218 
(158) 
- (lagged) 
punishment after 
warning 
668  1747  654  
(454) 
2  - trial rounds 
- punishment 
- redistribution 
550  1968  362 
(62) 
- redistribution of 
rule costs 
- no feedback (but 
own payoff) 
641  2085  300  
(0) 
1 
3  - punishment 
- ID 
789  1625  848 
(648) 
- roundly varying 
background stories 
- individual messages 
533  2270  50  
(0) 
4  - punishment 
- ID 
- individual messages 
1437  2302  560 
(310) 
- punishment 
- redistribution 
- individual messages 
- big bonus 
1795  2822  255 
(5) 
5  - punishment 
- redistribution 
361  1915  302 
(102) 
- minimum-effort 
- appeal 
1725  2583  452 
(252) 
2 
6  - punishment 
- appeal 
597  1829  530 
(280) 
- no feedback 
- 'big malus' for 
minimum-contributor 
if welfare < 2500 
(before rule-costs) 
- appeal 
1271  2263  500 
(0) 
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Seminar  Grp  Tournament 3  Contributions  Efficiency  Costs 
(variable 
costs) 
Tournament 4  Contributions  Efficiency  Costs (variable 
costs) 
1  - redistribution 
- ID 
734  2150  290 
(90) 
- redistribution + 
redistribution of rule-
costs 
- ID 
1449  2661  208  
(8) 
2  - (endogenous) redistribution of 
rule-costs administered by high-
contributors 
- ID 
627  2076  300 
(0) 
- redistribution of rule 
costs (every 4
th round) 
- vote on institution 
978  2486.0  101 
(0) 
1 
3  - individual messages (changing 
every round) 
703  2372  50 
(0) 
- cheap-talk contract 
(full contribution; no 
longer available after 
3
rd breach) 
- roundly appeals 
- individual feedback 
1411  2796.6  50 
(0) 
4  - punishment 
- redistribution 
- individual messages 
- big bonus 
1091  2291  364 
(114) 
- redistribution 
- big bonus 
- example in 
instructions (msg) 
2000  2850.0  350 
(0) 
5  - minimum-effort 
- punishment 
- redistribution 
- appeal 
2000  3000  200 
(0) 
- cheap-talk contract 
offered every 5
th 
round: endogenous 
'minimum-
contribution'  
- individual messages 
418  2200.8  50 
(0) 
2 
6  - no feedback 
- 'big malus' for minimum-
contributor if welfare < 3000 
(before rule-costs) 
1547  1828  1100 
(600) 
- appeals every 5
th 
round 
390  2184.0  50 
(0)   36 
 
 
Legend (fixed rule costs): 
appeal (50)  A statement is displayed to subjects before they play the game. The statement is possibly repeated every k rounds. Usually, the 
statement would appeal to moral values and/or a group sentiment. 
big bonus (0)*  In every playing round, points are deducted from the players conditional on their contribution behavior and transfered into a 'jackpot 
account' applying the formula for redistribution. At the end of the 25 rounds, the 'jackpot' is awarded to the highest-contributing 
player, with an equal-split rule in case of a tie. 
'big malus' (100)*  The lowest-contributing player is punished by 200 points if the group does not achieve a certain welfare benchmark. Costs are 
calculated as if the player is deducted 8 points each round (Total welfare cost in case of application: 200 + 400 = 600 points). 
cheap-talk contract (50)  Players are given the opportunity to vote on a 'contract' requiring them to contribute a specified amount of tokens. The contract is 
'enacted' only in case of unanimous consensus. The 'enactment' does not have any material consequences. In case of the endogenous 
'minimum-contribution' levels, players were meant to vote on increasing the initially specified level of 15 tokens by one token in case 
of full compliance.  
endogenous state authority (0)  Individual contributions are disclosed if the group invests 4 points into a secondary public good 'administration'; 
individual contributions to this 'administration' cannot surpass 2 points. If the 'administration' is 'constituted', its 
contributors may engage in peer-to-peer punishment (cost schedule as in punishment). 
example in instructions  An example specifying the payoffs of a single free-rider amongst full-contributors is contrasted to the payoff of a full 
contributor amongst equals. 
ID (200)  Players are given fixed ID numbers and informed of individual contributions of all players by ID number. 
individual messages (50)*  Pre-defined messages, automatically displayed to players conditional on their behavior in the game. 
minimum-effort (0)*  'Redistributing' back 'surplus contributions': any tokens contributed by a player i, which surpass the smallest contribution made by a 
group member are returned to i, diminished according to the redistribution formula, before the sum of contributions is multiplied by 
the public-good factor. 
no feedback (but own payoff; 0)  Players do not receive any feedback (except on their own payoff), not even about the sum of contributions. 
punishment (0)*  Deduction of x points, x < 9, from a player's income from the public-good according to the formula: 
Cost(x) = x²/4. These costs are born by all players if punishment is administered automatically, and by the punishing player in case of 
peer-to-peer punishment. Higher deductions are possible, but no perfect punishment automata are available: in this case, players 
either have to administer punishment themselves, or non-contributions are punished only with a certain probability. The 
corresponding automata have additional fixed costs:  
High probability punishment (probability of deduction = 1/2): 600 points 
Low probability punishment (probability of deduction = 1/10): 200 points 
(lagged) punishment after warning (0)*  A warning is issued to a player who does not comply with a specified condition. In case of repeated non-compliance, the player is   37 
punished automatically as described under punishment. 
(endogenous) redistribution (0)*  Transfer of points from one player to another/others. The points available for allocation, y, as a function of points deducted, x, are 
determined according to the following formula: 
y = sqrt(x - 1) + 1. In the case of endogenous redistribution, individual players (determined in correspondence to their contributions) 
may decide on the reallocation of points. 
redistribution of rule costs (0)*  In contrast to the default case, rule costs are allocated unequally among players. Under rule sets of this category, players are told they 
have to bear different shares of the rule costs depending on their contribution behavior. 
roundly varying background stories (50)  The public-good is framed in a different way in each round. An example for a framing would read: "In your neighborhood, cats are 
poisoned more and more often. Residents of the area are worried that the rat poison laid-out may also be eaten by dogs or even by 
little children. They are forming a vigilante group in charge of combing through the streets for irregularities and to collect the poison. 
As you do not have the time to participate in these activities, your family is thinking about donating € 20 for support. Do you want 
that?", followed by a yes-or-no decision. In case of a "no", the story goes on: "It could be your little daughter who swallows such a 
toxic bait. And do you want to lock up your cat the whole day long? The vigilante group is a good thing, how much do you want to 
give them? It's for the safety of your family?" 
trial rounds (100)  Players experience the rule set for a small number of rounds without payoff consequences before they play the game for 25 rounds. 
 
*Rule features marked are feasible only in conjunction with monitoring; a monitor requires costs of 200 points, independent of whether she announces the observed 
contributions as in ID or not. 
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Table B2: Classification of rule sets according to the characteristics described in section 3; the table specifies for each rule set whether it displays (1) a certain 
characteristic or not (0). 
 
Tournament Seminar Group pun punEP noRedEnd noBB noID FB noComm frame noFrameEP noEnd minEff°
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
2 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
2 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
2 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
2 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
5 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
6 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
 
° The category minEff is only listed for completeness. Those rule-sets displaying a “1” in this category were eliminated for our analysis, and the 
category was deleted. 